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During the course of 1992 the organization of political forces in Russia underwent many 
changes. As a result of a whole series of breakaways, splits, fusions, and unifications, 
three major blocs were created:
• The left-right opposition, uniting various communist and nationalist groupings;
• Civic Union (CU--in Russian, Grazhdansky soyuz), uniting three different parties 
led respectively by Aleksandr Rutskoi, Nikolai Travkin, and Arkadi Vol'sky; and
• Democratic Choice (in Russian, Demokratichesky vybor) a coalition of democratic 
forces formed on the basis of the Democratic Russia movement, as well as about 
30 other democratic organizations.
The three blocs are about equally represented in the Russian Parliament.
In recent weeks, the political struggle has intensified as a result of the increasingly 
tense relations between the president (i.e., the executive branch) and the Supreme 
Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies.
The Seventh Congress showed that both the conservative blocs, i.e., the left-right 
opposition and the CU, were ready to join forces in order to combat the executive 
branch. As a result, the democratic factions supporting the president in the Congress--
as well as in the Supreme Soviet--ended up in the minority.
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It is clear that the Seventh Congress completed the process of creating an additional 
political party, the "Party of the Soviets." This party's principal goal is to make the 
soviets all-powerful at the national level as well as at the local level. The Seventh 
Congress demonstrated this had been its intention when it succeeded in having the 
following clause included in the Russian Federation Constitution: "The Congress of 
People's Deputies is the supreme state organ of the Russian Federation" (i.e., not the 
"supreme legislative organ.") This violated one of the basic principles of the 
constitution--the division of powers.
The main policies advocated by each of the three blocs referred to above are as follows:
The left-right opposition calls for:
• The restoration of the USSR in its former borders by every possible means, up to 
and including force;
• The end of disarmament and conversion of the armaments industry, and 
restoration of Russia's military capabilities;
• The refusal by Russia to participate in any international actions to restrain 
aggressive acts on the part of the political leadership of Iraq or Serbia;
• The restoration of the rigid central state management of the economy; and
• The establishment of fixed prices for basic consumer goods.
In short, the left-right opposition advocates returning to a totalitarian system in Russia. 
Within its ranks, communists and "national-patriots" have united for the time being with 
the aim of overthrowing the democratic government. The opposition frequently employs 
methods that violate legality, such as public meetings at which anti-Semitic banners are 
on display, and the deliberately provoked riots and violent confrontations with the police. 
A large number of nationalistic, profascist publications has sprung up against which the 
Russian Federation Public Prosecutor has begun to initiate criminal proceedings under 
the pressure of public opinion. Among the groups within the opposition are openly 
profascist organizations that make use of fascist symbols and possess their own 
detachments of "storm troopers."
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To illustrate the intentions of the opposition, one need only cite the statements of one of 
its leaders, former KGB General Aleksandr Sterligov, who has said straight out that, in 
the event of their gaining power, they would not resort to legal procedures to combat 
their political opponents, but would rely on the experience acquired by their fathers and 
grandfathers during the 1930s. The experience in question was gained by these 
politicians' spiritual forebears in Stalin's torture chambers.
The basis of social support of the left-right opposition is comprised above all of 
pensioners. These are the people who have suffered most as the result of the economic 
reforms. Moreover, their thinking has been conditioned by many years of living under 
totalitarianism, and naturally their attitudes cannot be expected to change overnight. 
However, the opposition also enjoys support among middle-aged and young people. 
These are individuals who strive to improve their standard of living primarily by means 
of stripping benefits from those who currently possess them, rather than by earning 
them by their own abilities and efforts. It was precisely these segments of the population 
from whom the Bolsheviks drew support when establishing their power in Russia.
In view of the possibility that the economic situation in Russia will deteriorate further, 
one must be aware that there exists a serious threat of the rebirth of totalitarianism in 
Russia--possibly in a new shape, i.e., a form of Russian fascism.
The second major bloc referred to earlier, the Civic Union, claims to be in the center of 
the political spectrum in Russia. What is unclear is the type of center it represents--what 
its background is, and what future it is likely to have.
The policies of the Civic Union are determined by the actions of its leaders, i.e., Rutskoi, 
Vol'sky, and Travkin. The principal characteristic of these men is that they rose to 
prominence in the ranks of the CPSU and made their careers within the seraglio of the 
party. These men were never dissidents opposed to the totalitarian political system; 
instead they came to a quite successful political accommodation with it. It was only 
chance and personal ambition that led them to become leaders of political 
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organizations. Thus their biographies are strikingly different from that of Boris Yel'tsin, 
who also had been a high-ranking party official, but then rebelled against the party and 
went over to the camp of its political opponents.
These leaders lack any clearly defined political position of their own, and as a result in 
practice the CU advocates the same aims as does the left-right opposition--the 
difference being that the same goals are to be achieved not "by any methods," or "at 
any price." Consequently, the same list of objectives as for the "left-right opposition" can 
be reiterated, with qualifications:
• The restoration of the USSR in its former borders, but not entirely "by any means"; 
and
• The slow down--but not the cessation--of the disarmament process and industrial 
conversion, etc.
Whereas the left-right opposition is opposed to reforms, according to its leaders the CU 
is in favor of reforms, however for reforms at a slower pace, reforms "without shock," 
the "Chinese option," and so on. In practice, what is being proposed is a return to the 
type of reforms that were carried out by Gorbachev and his prime ministers Ryzhkov 
and Pavlov. However, history in the form of the August 1991 putsch finally put an end to 
such experiments. Returning to this path would make a catastrophe inevitable, with 
power in the hands of the red-brown opposition.
The Civic Union does not possess any broadly based popular support. Even within the 
political organizations that form part of the bloc, large numbers of members do not 
share the views of the bloc's leaders. The Civic Union is supported by a portion of the 
liberal-minded communists who have remained faithful to the "socialist choice," by 
reactionary representatives of the "corps of directors" who see no prospects for 
themselves in a market economy, and by the mid-level nomenklatura, people one might 
call the "nomenklatura nachwuchs." Consequently, if the Civic Union represents the 
interests of a center, in reality this means the center of the spectrum of communist 
supporters.
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The Democratic Choice coalition arose as the result of the lengthy formation process 
of an alliance of democratic forces around the Democratic Russia movement, a process 
that was initiated by the movement's Coordinating Council. Almost immediately after 
President Yel'tsin addressed the Fifth Congress of People's Deputies in November 
1991, the Coordinating Council called for the creation of Public Reform Committees (in 
Russian, OKRR) throughout Russia. At the present time, these committees are the most 
numerous public organizations in Russia actively promoting economic reform at the 
grassroots level. Without the work of these committees, reforms at the regional level 
would never have gotten off the ground. The OKRR bring together people who want to 
ensure that reforms are carried out and are able to help in practical terms. They include 
professional privatization consultants, local administration officials, presidential 
representatives, entrepreneurs, industrialists, and farmers. It is significant that members 
of different parties and organizations who resigned from Democratic Russia at the 
behest of their leaders (e.g., rank-and-file members of the Russian Democratic Party--
DPR) are working successfully in the OKRR committees.
The two Fora of Reform Supporters that have been held (the first in July and the second 
in November 1992) were a natural outcome of the activities of the OKRR. The first 
forum decided to create an organizing committee to establish a bloc of reform 
supporters, and this committee has the mandate to link the regional OKRR and other 
similar organizations at the all-Russian level.
Democratic Choice has not yet completed setting up its organizational structure. 
However, up to the present time the Agreement on an Alliance of Reform Supporters 
that was drafted has been signed by about 30 organizations backing radical economic 
reform in Russia, including the creation of a market economy, broadly based popular 
privatization, legally guaranteed private ownership of land, legislation abolishing 
monopolies, and the promotion of competition in consumer goods production. In political 
life, Democratic Choice advocates political stability, firm democratic power, and legality 
and the rule of law as guarantees of the implementation of economic reform, as well as 
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civil peace and human liberties. The adoption without delay of a new Russian 
Federation Constitution is one of its top-priority objectives.
The Democratic Choice bloc enjoys fairly broad social support. Above all, it has the 
backing of supporters of Democratic Russia, which is the biggest mass political 
organization in the country, as well as the intelligentsia in the sciences, technology, and 
the humanities, and the most highly qualified workers. Moreover, the bloc has the 
support of many of the "new entrepreneurs," i.e., farmers, members of cooperatives, 
and leaseholders. In other words, the social basis of the bloc is comprised of the 
potential "middle class" of the civic society that is in process of formation in Russia, and 
this fact firmly places the Democratic Choice bloc at the center of the political spectrum.
By a bitter irony of fate, however, the hardships inflicted by the initial reforms have 
mainly fallen precisely on these social groups: While affecting the overwhelming 
majority of the population, the sharp reduction in living standards that has occurred has 
hit hardest engineers and blue-collar workers employed by "high-tech" enterprises, as 
well as scientific researchers, physicians, teachers, etc., whose incomes have fallen to 
the level of the wages of unskilled workers. This phenomenon has resulted in an 
increase in political apathy--an indifference that constitutes a danger principally for 
Russian democratic forces.
Immediate Tasks 
The Seventh Congress of People's Deputies brought about an intensification of the 
conflicts between the various political forces and stepped up the political struggle. In the 
address he gave to the citizens of Russia during the Congress, President Yel'tsin 
referred to a decision taken at the Congress to "carry out a creeping coup d'etat." He 
had every reason to speak in these terms. As mentioned earlier, the Congress is 
described as the supreme organ of state power in the Constitution currently in force. In 
view of this situation, the country faced the prospect of dictatorship by the Congress--
which in practice would have meant dictatorship by Ruslan Khasbulatov, the chairman 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.
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Indeed, one can say that at the present time the real threat to democracy, and the real 
political organization aspiring to supreme power in Russia, are constituted by the 
Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. The aggressive majority within 
these bodies has joined ranks around a very dangerous leader who already possesses 
great power, i.e., Khasbulatov.
The President's address to the people was a highly responsible political act that led to a 
fairly rapid--albeit difficult--agreement in the shape of the "Resolution on the 
Stabilization of the Constitutional System of the Russian Federation" that was adopted. 
To put it very briefly, this agreement provides for the return of the mutually opposed 
branches of power to the position that existed preceding the Congress, and also 
authorizes the holding of an All-Russian Referendum on the principal clauses to be 
included in a new Russian Federation Constitution. It is difficult to overestimate the 
importance of this decision. The adoption of a new constitution and the subsequent 
election of a new legislature should free the country to a large degree of many burdens 
inherited from the past that still weigh upon our young democracy.
I believe that the democratic forces in Russia fully realize the responsibility incumbent 
upon them in connection with the future referendum. There is no room for illusions 
respecting the intentions of the opposition, with regard both to the date for holding the 
referendum and to the content of the principal clauses of the new constitution, as well 
as over the proper observance of the above-mentioned agreement on the stabilization 
of the constitutional system. Already there have been statements referring to the 
desirability of holding an Eighth Congress of People's Deputies in March 1993 (i.e., not 
in April, following the referendum), and of delaying the Constitutional Referendum until 
next summer, etc. The supporters of the Democratic Choice bloc ought to come out in 
suppport not only of the referendum, but also--no less importantly--of the original date 
for holding it. In my view, we ought furthermore to ensure that an additional question is 
asked in the referendum, i.e., "Whom do the citizens trust to adopt the new constitution: 
the present membership of the Congress of People's Deputies, a newly elected 
Congress, or a specially elected Constitutional Assembly?"
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Work to inform the public on these issues has already begun: public hearings are being 
scheduled and these will permit us to define our position regarding the principal clauses 
of the new constitution. We also plan to set up an appropriate organizational structure 
that will enable us to carry out a public campaign to overcome the widespread popular 
indifference to politics discussed earlier. The extent of this political apathy was shown 
recently during elections in the Dmitrov district of Moscow oblast' as well as in the 
Krasnodar Region, when massive numbers of people failed to go to the polls.
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